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BOOK REVIEWS 369 
Water into Wine? An Investigation of the Concept of Miracle, by Robert A. 
H. Larmer. Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1988. Pp. xii and 
155. $22.50. 
DAVID BASINGER, Roberts Wesleyan College. 
At least since the time of Hume, most philosophers have defined a miracle 
as a violation of a natural law brought about by a divine agent. Larmer agrees 
that miracles should be understood as events brought about by transcendent 
agents. However, he argues in Chapters 1, 2 and 5 that belief in miracles is 
in no sense incompatible with our scientific understanding of natural phe-
nomena. 
Natural laws, we are told, are conditional statements. They tell us that under 
certain natural conditions, certain events will occur. They tell us, for example, 
that under certain natural conditions, water does not turn into wine. But let 
us assume that some transcendent being turns water into wine by creating or 
annihilating "units of mass/energy" (20). In this case, something has occurred 
which is beyond the power of nature to produce. But no law has been violated 
since the relevant natural causal conditions are no longer exhaustive. We now 
have additional transcendent causal factors not presupposed in the relevant 
laws in question. 
However, if a transcendent being creates or annihilates mass/energy, hasn't 
it at least violated the First Law of Thermodynamics? No, Larmer argues. 
We certainly do have good reasons to believe that "in an isolated system the 
total amount of energy remains constant" (25). But the claim that the universe 
is an isolated system-the claim that the universe is not open to reordering 
by a transcendent agent-is simply an arbitrary metaphysical assumption that 
the theist need not grant. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with philosophical objections to belief in 
miracles. Larmer first considers the arguments of those who claim the mirac-
ulous is a psuedo-concept. He considers, for example, Hume's famous con-
tention that the evidence in favor of a miracle can never, in principle, 
outweigh the evidence for the natural laws it purportedly violates. And he 
considers Alastair McKinnon's influential claim that the concept of miracle 
is self-contradictory because it is impossible for any specific event to be 
labeled a violation of a natural law when such laws are ultimately only 
summarized descriptions of what actually occurs. Larmer concludes that crit-
icisms of this type are misguided since they normally presuppose unjustifia-
bly that miracles are to be understood as violations of natural laws. 
Larmer then turns his attention to those who grant that the miraculous is a 
coherent concept but maintain that the claim that an event is beyond the 
power of nature to produce could never justifiably be made. He grants that 
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such a claim would always be corrigible but argues that there are conditions 
under which it could justifiably be affirmed. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are concerned with positive grounds for belief in 
miracles. Those who believe in miracles, he tells us, must establish three 
things: that the notion of an immaterial causal agent is coherent, that there 
is a positive body of evidence which supports the claim that such an agent 
has actually overridden nature, and that theism (the world-view within which 
belief in miracles is housed) can explain all that physicalism (a wholly nat-
uralistic world-view) can explain and more. He concentrates on the latter two 
issues, concluding that "testimonial evidence could conceivably justify belief 
in miracles" (103) and that such evidence can, in principle, "help to establish 
the truth of theism in general and Christianity in particular" (113). 
This book has much to recommend it. It is written in a style that will make 
it accessible even to thoughtful undergraduates. And much of what Larmer 
argues is convincing. He is correct, I believe, in arguing that it is not best to 
conceive of miracles as violations of natural laws. His response to the stan-
dard attacks on the miraculous are thoughtful and sometimes innovative. And 
his insistence that belief (or disbelief) in miracles be discussed in the context 
of the relevant world-view out of which it arises is an important point often 
overlooked. 
I do, though, have some concerns. Larmer's characterization of the mirac-
ulous as an unusual physical event which would never have occurred except 
through the activity of a transcendent agent immediately raises two related, 
but distinct epistemological questions. Under what conditions can it be main-
tained justifiably that an unusual event has occurred? And under what con-
ditions can it be maintained justifiably that a given unusual event, assuming 
it has occurred as reported, was brought about by a transcendent agent? 
But Larmer at points does not appear to recognize the relevance of this 
distinction. For example, he tells us that there are "three basic types of 
evidence relevant to establishing the occurrence of a miracle" (95): personal 
observation, relevant physical traces, and the testimony of others. However, 
as Richard Swinburne and others have noted, such evidence is primarily 
related to the question of whether the unusual event in question has actually 
occurred. And it may be sufficient, in principle, for this purpose. Such evi-
dence, for example, may well allow us to determine whether water has actu-
ally turned into wine or a withered arm has actually returned instantaneously 
to its normal size. But two individuals can agree, on the basis of such evi-
dence, that a given unusual event has occurred and yet justifiably differ on 
the question of whether a transcendent agent was responsible, and, thus 
whether the event ought to be considered miraculous. In short, the types of 
evidence Larmer discusses are certainly not sufficient to establish the tran-
scendent causation necessary to label an event miraculous. 
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I am also somewhat perplexed by the relationship Larmer sees between 
miracles and world-views. Specifically, I am perplexed by Larmer's claim 
that "if an event can be satisfactorily explained by theism as being a miracle, 
but physicalism can offer no satisfactory explanation of it, then we are jus-
tified in seeing it as independent evidence for the superiority of theism over 
physicalism" (114). To sayan event is independent evidence for the superi-
ority of theism has at least two possible readings: that the evidence for this 
specific event stands as one reason to believe that theism is superior or that 
the evidence for this specific event is a sufficient reason to believe that theism 
is superior. If Larmer means the former, then his claim may well be true. If 
we are only considering the evidence related to one specific 'miracle,' theism 
may well appear more strongly confirmed. And if we are only considering 
the evidence related to one specific instance of seemingly gratuitous evil, 
nontheism may well appear more strongly confirmed. 
But all this can be granted with impunity by both the theist and nontheist. 
As Alvin Plantinga has so forcefully argued, one must consider all the rele-
vant data when assessing the plausibility of a world-view. Accordingly, a 
theist can grant that theism may seem implausible when considered only in 
light of all the evil in the world, yet still justifiably argue that theism is most 
plausible when considered in light of all the other relevant data-e.g., 
changed lives, the starry heavens. And a nontheist can grant that nontheism 
may seem implausible, given consideration of only the evidence for one 
alleged miracle, yet still justifiably argue that nontheism is most plausible 
when considered in light of all the other relevant data-e.g., the amount of 
evil we experience. Thus, if Larmer thinks that the evidence for a miracle (or 
even all miracles) can, in principle, stand as a sufficient reason (or even a 
very strong reason) for preferring theism to non theism, I believe he is mis-
taken. 
Overall, though, I recommend this book for those who are interested in the 
current state of the philosophical debate concerning the miraculous. 
